Incentives and optimal antitrust policy by Jellal, Mohamed & Souam, Said
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Incentives and optimal antitrust policy
Mohamed Jellal and Said Souam
Al Makrˆızi Institut D’e´conomie, Rabat , Morocco
10. July 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57246/
MPRA Paper No. 57246, posted 11. July 2014 13:54 UTC
  
 
 
 
* 
 
 
Mohamed Jellal          Said Souam* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revised Version July 2014 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*Jellal Mohamed , Al Makrîzi Institut d’économie Rabat , Said Souam, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La 
Défense , Paris X. 
We thank Patricia Charléty, Philippe Choné, Claude Fluet, Nicolas Marceau, Anne Perrot and Michael Visser for 
very helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyze a situation where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission 
of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments 
at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing 
him with information which enhances the probability of the success of the prosecution. More 
precisely, we explore the efficiency consequences of a contest between the audit inspector and 
the cartel. Both of them bid to win the contest by expending efforts. We show that the race issue 
depends positively on the financial incentives proposed to the inspector but the impact of an 
increase of the level of the fine, to be paid once an illegal agreement is detected, is ambiguous. 
Moreover, we show that the optimal combination of the two instruments consists in two regimes. 
When the marginal cost of providing the relevant information is relatively high, the antitrust 
authority equally shares the collected fine and does not provide the inspector with any 
information. Conversely, when this marginal cost is relatively small, the authority uses the two 
instruments. She has to provide him with the maximum level of information consistent with 
winning the contest with certainty. 
 
Keywords: Antitrust Enforcement, Collusion, Moral Hazard, Contest. 
JEL Classification: L40, K42. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
    One of the main difficulties in formulating antitrust policy is the lack of information on 
possible restrictive agreements and on firms’ generated effort to conceal unlawful actions. In 
practice the antitrust authorities are subject to two sorts of constraints: limited resources and 
imperfect information. Because resources are limited, the authorities cannot monitor all the 
markets and investigate all the firms which are suspected of colluding. The second problem is 
that markets are rarely transparent. The authorities do not perfectly observe the characteristics 
and behavior of the firms.This asymmetry of information is the source of adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems that reduce the efficiency and impact of public interventions. 
 
    Moreover, whenever an authority delegates enforcement of audit policy, opportunities for 
corruption arise
1
. Therefore, in order to limit non benevolent behavior towards firms, the 
authorities motivate the delegated inspector by paying him a reward per dollar of fine (Becker 
and Stigler, 1974). Detection of violation of competition laws appears therefore as a complex 
double moral hazard game in which we explore the efficiency consequences of a contest 
between a delegated agency and some ”collusive firms”. We focus on the trade off between 
the optimal reward rate, the delegated agency’s enforcement effort and firms’ ”secret” effort 
to hide restrictive agreements. 
 
      Even though our analysis is done in an antitrust framework, it can be applied to other 
areas. The basic situation is the following one. Suppose that an authority suspects an agent of 
infringing a law. It then delegates to an inspector the task of collecting sufficient documentary 
evidence to convict the agent. The question is then how to give the right incentives to the 
inspector in order to expend the optimal effort of detection when the agent can hide this 
documentary evidence. This issue can arise in several contexts. We can cite for example tax 
evasion, pollution, minimum wage enforcement, cost falsification in insurance, etc. 
 
      Our analysis is complementary to the one used in some models of antitrust enforcement. 
Pénard and Souam (2002) generalize the work of Besanko and Spulber (1989) and analyze the 
optimal policy from the point of view of the competition authorities in order to efficiently 
deter collusion in a given industry (in a context of asymmetric information between the two 
                                                 
1
 See for example Milgrom and Robert (1988) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) 
parties about the cost of production of the industry). By devoting more resources to control 
activities, the authorities can increase the probability of detecting collusion and gather the 
necessary evidence to condemn the firms involved in such activity. There is a trade-off 
between the number of interventions and their effectiveness. A smaller number of 
interventions can allow the authorities to devote more resources to each intervention, thereby 
increasing the probability of success of the interventions that are undertaken. But in doing so, 
they leave more markets without monitoring. Pénard and Souam (2002) consider that the cost 
of detecting, prosecuting and fining the guilty firms is exogenous and characterize the best 
policy, from the authorities’ point of view, within this framework. 
  
      Our contribution in this paper can be considered as an attempt to explain the origins of 
this cost. By opening this black box, we shed light on an important aspect of the antitrust 
process. We show that the race issue depends on the financial incentives proposed to the 
delegated agency but does not always depend on the level of the fine to be paid once an illegal 
agreement is detected. We also emphasize the fact that financial incentives can be substituted 
by available economic data
2
 for the delegated agency (information provision). 
 
     The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the assumptions, 
section 3 analyzes the incentives to undertake efforts and characterizes the optimal antitrust 
policy in an asymmetric environment. Section 4 shows how should be the optimal 
combination between the two instruments used in our analysis (financial incentives vs. 
information provision). Finally, in section 5 we conclude and give some directions for future 
research. 
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 Available economic data correspond for instance to price data or industry output observations or any relevant 
information which summarizes the behavior of the industry in the past. Collecting this is of course costly.  
2 .The Model 
   We consider a two-player game. Player 1 is a delegated antitrust agency called the audit 
inspector. Player 2 represents some ”collusive firms”. We assume the game played by the 
firms to be per se illegal. Indeed, competition policy in most modern economies typically 
makes price-fixing illegal, even if this was not always the case
3
. 
      
Moreover, we consider that the inspector can obtain information about potential violations of 
antitrust laws and can detect a violation with a probability    1,,0
21
 meeP . This 
probability of detection of a violation of antitrust laws depends on the enforcement effort 
1
e  
of the audit inspector, the effort 
2
e  exerted by the collusive firms in order to conceal unlawful 
actions and on the economic data (information) m  available to the audit inspector once he 
decides to investigate a potential violation case. If the firms are found to have colluded, they 
are sued and condemned to pay an exogenous amount of fine F 4. 
 
     From a social point of view, collusion is bad per se but its deterrence is costly. There then 
exists a problem of how to give the right incentives to the audit inspector in order to expend 
effort in detecting price agreements. We assume that the audit inspector is able to determine 
on the basis of documentary evidence whether explicit collusion has taken place. However, he 
only wins the contest with certainty when the result is not contested by the ”collusive firms”. 
 
     For the sake of computational simplification
5
, we do assume that the contest itself is 
modeled as a ”lottery auction” whereby the probability of detecting the violation is 
determined by a unit-logit function: 
                
 
 
21
1
21
1
1
,,
eem
em
meeP


          for each 0m                                        (1) 
     This is now a traditional approach and is used in different contexts
6
. Both players ”bid” to 
win the antitrust decision. The bid takes the form of efforts expended by the audit inspector 
and the ”collusive firms” in the contest. Moreover, both players are assumed to be risk 
neutral. 
                                                 
3
 Historically, collusion was legal in many European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. 
4
 The commitment of the authorities is assumed to be credible. This is similar to an extensive literature on  
random audit in the case of incomplete information. See for example Baron and Besanko (1984) and Reinganum 
and Wilde (1985). 
5
 Hereafter, we give more general results when it is possible. 
6
 See Dixit (1987), Hirschleifer (1988) and Heyes (1997) for various examples. 
     The antitrust authority motivates the audit inspector by paying him a reward   per unity of 
collected fine, and by giving him a fixed wage w . The enforcement effort generates a cost 
 
11
e  for the audit inspector. 
     The expected utility of the audit inspector is given by: 
            
112121
,,,;1 eFwmeePwmeePU    
            
1121
,, eFmeePw                                                                           (2) 
We assume that the inspector’s objective function is strictly concave in the enforcement effort 
1
e .  
     Given the effort 
1
e , the firms’ problem is to maximize their expected profit net of the cost 
of concealing the unlawful actions: 
       
222121
,,,;1 eFmeePmeePV    
          
2221
,, eFmeeP                                                                              (3) 
 
where  is the firms’ profit generated by the collusive behavior, and  
22
e  is the disutility 
generated by the hidden restrictive agreement, which can consist in the burden cost to reach 
such agreement and the effort exerted to contest the race issue.V is also supposed to be 
concave in 
2
e . 
  
3 .Characterization of the Equilibrium 
    Let us now analyze the incentives to expend efforts for the ”collusive firms” and the audit 
inspector. We will also characterize the optimal antitrust policy within the context of 
asymmetric information considered in this paper.  
    Let us consider the maximization program of the delegated agency. We assume the 
inspector to be a leader relatively to the ”collusive firms”7.The audit inspector chooses an 
enforcement effort 
1
e  in order to maximize the net expected returns given the firms’ reaction 
function: 
                                                 
7
 In practice, when a preliminary investigation is launched the delegated agency ( for exampleDGCCRF, 
Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes, in France) expend 
effort through its inspectors in order to gather evidence of an infringement. Thus firms will thus try or not to hide 
information about their illegal activity if any.This is why we model the contest as a Stackelberg game in our ex 
post intervention framework. Nonetheless, our results are still valid under simulataneous contest game as we will 
mention it hereafter. 
                
1121
,, 
1
eFmeePwUMax
e
   
 s.t.          
2221~2
~,~,  
2
eFmeePVMaxArge
e
                                     (4) 
 
      In order to exhibit an explicit solution of this program, let us assume that  
iiii
ee    
for i = 1; 2. 
i
  is considered as the marginal cost of increasing the effort from the point of 
view of the agent i. 
     Hereafter, we first look for the optimal effort chosen by the firms in order to conceal 
unlawful actions. The following lemma gives the collusive firms’ effort level expended in the 
contest game depending on the effort expended by the audit inspector. 
 
Lemma 1    
The optimal firms’ effort to hide restrictive agreements is given by: 
                    
 
 
 
  
1
      1  
1
2
11
2
1*
2
 m
F
eifem
Fem
e



  
                    otherwisee          0*
2
 . 
 
Proof. 
 Let us consider the first order condition when maximizing the firms’ profit. This is given by: 
                 0,,,,('
221
2
2221
2
2






  mee
e
P
eFmeeP
e
eV  
if the optimum is an interior solution. Using the definitions of the functions, one can easily 
see that this is equivalent to: 
        
 
   22
21
1
1
1



eem
Fem
 
which gives a positive value for 
 
 
 
  
1
  1  
1
2
11
2
1*
2
 m
F
eifem
Fem
e



 . 
 If this last inequality is not verified, we have   0'
2
eV  for every 
2
e . The optimal solution 
is then  0*
2
e .                                                                        (Q.E.D). 
 
    The firms’ reaction function is continuous but not monotonic in the enforcement effort. 
This non monotonicity is of some interest in our context. For comparatively low levels of 
contest effort 
1
e  by the audit inspector, the ”collusive firms” respond to increases in that level 
by increasing their own concealing effort 
2
e . Beyond some threshold level, however they 
react to further increases by decreasing their own effort. Moreover, let us remark that the 
firms ”fight their corner” more strongly when penalty F  is high, than when it is low. The 
converse is true for the marginal cost of effort 
2
 . 
 
     Let us now derive the optimal enforcement effort of the inspector in the contest.This is the 
purpose of the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2   
  The optimal inspector’s  effort is given by  : 
                    
 
   1,
1
2
         1
2
2
1
2
2
1
*
1
m
m
MinifmFe 


















  
                   
 
otherwise
m
F
e          
1
2
*
1

  
 
Proof. 
 As lemma 1 stated it, when   
 
   
1
2
1
m
F
e

 we have
 
   1  
1
1
2
1*
2
em
Fem
e 



 
The probability of detection is thus:  
   
 
 
1
2
*
21
1*
21
1
1
1
,, e
F
m
eem
em
meeP




  
and the expected utility of the inspector is: 
   
111211
*
21
1,, eFemweFmeePwU    
We then have an interior optimum at       1
2
2
2
1
*
1



mFe 





 when this is less than 
 
   
1
2
m
F

.One can easily show that this the case when : 
  







 1,
1
2
2
1
m
Min


 . 
When 
 
   
1
2
1
m
F
e

 ; the effort exerted by the ”collusive firms” is null (  0*
2
e ). 
We then have 
11
eFwU   . It is straightforward to see that the expected utility  
1
U
decreases with 
1
e . The optimal solution is then to set e¤1 at its minimum possible level (i.e. 
 
   
1
2
1
m
F
e

 .                                                    (Q.E.D) 
 
    Lemma 2 explicitly gives us the inspector’s enforcement effort as a function of the rate of 
reward . Any change in the reward system affects the enforcement effort of the inspector. It 
is worth noting that for low values of   this effort increases with the level of the information 
m   and the marginal cost of the firms ‘expending effort 
2
  while for high levels of  , the 
contrary happens. Moreover, this effort intuitively increases with the level of the fine F  and 
decreases with 
1
 . 
     The following proposition characterizes the optimal firms’ effort and derives the likelihood 
of detecting restrictive agreements in the context of our race model. 
 
Proposition 3  
i). The optimal collusive firms’ effort to conceal unlawful action is defined by: 
     
 
    
otherwisee
mifm
Fm
e
                    0
    12
4
1
*
2
212
1
*
2



 


 
ii). The probability of detecting unlawful agreement is given by: 
    
 
 
 
  .                 1,
        
2
1
,
*
1
2*
otherisemP
mif
m
mP





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

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Proof. 
 If  m   ,we have  
2
2
1
*
1
1
2



mFe 





  and 
 
   1  
1 *
1
2
*
1*
2
em
Fem
e 



. 
A simple substitution of the value of  
*
1
e in the second formula gives the equilibrium value of  
 
  
212
1
*
2
12
4
1



m
Fm
e 

 .Moreover, the probability of detection can be written 
as a function of only   and m ,  
 
 
2
1
,
1
2* 



m
mP

 .Otherwise, when  m  ; the 
optimum level of the firms’ effort is nul and 
 
   
1
2
*
1
m
F
e

 . The probability of detection 
is thus equal to 1 and the authorities are certain to win the race issue. (Q.E.D) 
 
   Let us remark that in equilibrium a marginal increase in the reward rate   induces an 
increase in the probability of detection. Moreover, as the intuition suggests the probability of 
detection increases with m  and  
2
 and decreases with 
1
 .  
   However, it is important to notice that the likelihood of detection is independent of the fine 
level F  in our context. This could be seen as a source of divergence with ex ante deterrence 
models à la Becker which would recommend to put the level of fine as high as possible
8
.This 
quite counterintuitive result can be explained by the fact that even though an increase in the 
level of the fine will give more incentives to the audit inspector to expend effort to find 
evidence of an illegal activity, the ”colluding firms” are also incited to enhance their effort to 
win the race (the firms ”fight their corner” more vigorously). The latter effect exactly 
counterbalances the former in our example. 
   This explains why the contest issue depends on the financial incentives proposed to the 
audit inspector while it does not depend on the level of the fine. This interesting result still 
holds under a simultaneous contest. 
 
  What can we say from a general point of view about this result? Of course, our extreme 
result is due to the choice of a logit function for the probability of detection. In general, the 
                                                 
8
 In a different enforcement model, Malik (1990) shows that the costs associated with avoidance activities , that 
reduce the probability of being caught and fined, imply that it is not necessarily optimal to set fines for offenses 
as high as possible. 
derivative of the probability of detection w.r.t. the fine, 
F
P

 *
, in equilibrium is quite 
complicated in our case and its sign is a priori ambiguous. 
   In order to simplify the analysis and show this ambiguity, let us consider the case of a 
simultaneous contest. In this case , the first order conditions are given:  
1
1
 


F
e
P
and 
2
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F
e
e
P
F
e
e
P
F
P











 *
2
2
**
1
1
*
.. . By using the first order conditions, we can deduce that : 
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This finally gives: 
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. Using once again the first order conditions 
allows to write it as follows: 
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  In this kind of literature the following properties are generally assumed: 0
2
1
2



e
P
and 
0
2
2
2



e
P
  (i.e. decreasing marginal returns to 
1
e  from the inspector’s perspective and to 
2
e  
from the cartel’s perspective).The sign of 
F
P

 *
 is thus given by the sign of
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e
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



 .  Depending on the different parameters and on the levels of the 
second derivatives, 
F
P

 *
can be positive, null or negative. We thus would like to emphasize 
the fact that once a decision of delegation is taken, the impact of an increase of the fine on the 
probability of a successful issue is a priori ambiguous. So, from an ex ante point of view 
putting the fine at its maximum level could be not optimal in certain cases and optimal in 
other ones. The firms’ effort is a concave function in the reward rate  . The more the 
financial incentives increase, the more the inspector’s enforcement effort increases and as a 
consequence, firms’ effort increases to reach a maximum level. Nevertheless, after the 
corresponding threshold, the inspector’s enforcement effort is so high that it is not in the 
interest of the firms to pursue their effort to contest the issue. They will therefore choose to 
lessen their effort when   is too high. It is interesting here to make a parallel with the way 
this effort varies with the inspector’s effort as seen before. Concerning the probability of 
detection  mP ,*  , let us mention that there exists a cut-off level which determines the 
efficiency of the detection (the certainty of the race issue) as shown in figure 3. Moreover, 
this cut-off reward share is a decreasing function of the economic data at the disposal of the 
inspector (
 
 m
m
Min 





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


1,
1
2
2
1
).Therefore for all positive m; available economic 
data can be considered as a substitute to the reward share proposed to the inspector. The 
question of the optimal mix of these two instruments is analyzed in the next section. 
 
 
 
4. Monetary Incentives versus Information Provision 
    For a given level of the maximal fine F  chosen by the legislator, one can ask the question 
of which combination (monetary incentives to the inspector ; provision of information) should 
the antitrust authority choose. This issue raises a practical problem which can be found in 
other contexts: which welfare function to use? Many alternative solutions are possible. In our 
context with an ex post intervention, one can think that a possible objective should be to 
maximize the expected amount of collected fine net of the reward given to the inspector and 
of the cost of providing him with the information (supposed to be linear m
3
 ), since the 
illegal activity has already taken place. 
 
  The net expected collected fine is given by: 
   E(Collected Fine)  =     mFmP
3
* ,1    
  The following proposition gives the optimal combination from the antitrust authority’s point 
of view and shows that the solution is quite simple and intuitive. 
 
Proposition 4    
The optimal combination consists possibly in two different regimes. 
1. When the marginal cost of providing the information is relatively high : F
1
2
3
8

   , the 
best policy is to share the fine equally with the audit inspector: 
2
1*  , and not to provide 
him with any information  (first regime). 
2. Conversely, when the marginal cost is relatively small : F
1
2
3
8

  , a second regime is 
optimal: give the highest share consistent with a probability of detection equal to unity and 
choose the level 
*m  accordingly. 
 
Proof: See the appendix. 
    This proposition sheds some light on how the optimal combination between a monetary 
reward and an information provision should be chosen by the antitrust authority while 
delegating the gathering of evidence of anticompetitive practices. In this perspective, it is 
interesting to see that even if it is always possible in our framework to make sure that the 
authority surely wins the contest, it is not always in her interest to do that. This is basically 
due to the fact that when the marginal cost of providing the information is relatively high, the 
authority will not use this instrument. Thus she has only one instrument at her disposal: 
rewarding the audit inspector. But it is too costly to be sure to win the contest. The authority 
could do better: equally share the collected fine with the audit inspector without providing 
him with any information. In this case, the probability of detection is strictly less than 1: the 
race issue is uncertain. 
     Conversely, when the marginal cost of providing the information is relatively small, the 
authority will use both instruments. She will then provide the audit inspector with the 
maximum level of information consistent with winning the contest with certainty (the 
probability of detection equals unity). It then appears that the substitution between the two 
instruments is quite intuitive in our framework even though the way it should be designed is 
asymmetric relatively to the two instruments. Indeed, the authority should always give 
monetary incentives to the audit inspector while in some cases provision of information 
should not be used since it is too costly. Under this framework, it seems important to use both 
instruments if the antitrust authority wants to be sure to win the contest. Rewarding the audit 
inspector only is not sufficient to reach this target. 
 
5. Conclusion 
    In this paper, we developed a strategic model of pure antitrust enforcement. We have 
studied the impact of a two-dimension effort game where the task of proving that an agent is 
guilty is delegated to an audit inspector. The antitrust authority can enhance the probability of 
detection of anticompetitive practices by using two instruments: rewarding the audit inspector 
and providing him with information. Our results are two-fold. First, we show that in our 
framework the outcome of the contest game (probability of winning the contest by the 
authority) depends positively on the financial incentives proposed to the inspector. However, 
the impact of an increase of the fine is a priori ambiguous on the probability of success. This 
last result seems to be quite general at least for the kind of rewarding scheme used in this 
article. 
     Second, we showed the existence of two regimes concerning the optimal combination 
between the two instruments (financial reward and information provision). Roughly speaking, 
the first regime consists in equally sharing the fine with the audit inspector and not providing 
him with information. In this case, the probability of the detection is strictly less than one 
which means that the firms are not completely deterred from hiding the relevant information 
and contesting the race issue. This is the case when the marginal cost of providing 
information is relatively high. Conversely, the second regime consists in using the two 
instruments. In this case, the authority can increase the probability of detection adequately by 
prodiving the audit inspector with information (whose marginal cost is relatively small). She 
still uses financial incentives. In this case, the reward is just sufficient to completely deter the 
firms from contesting the race issue. We think that an interesting development for our analysis 
would be to couple the two approaches: ex ante intervention (deterrence models à la Becker) 
and the ex post intervention as developed in the present article. It would be interesting to shed 
some light on the potentially important divergence between these two kinds of intervention 
particularly in the antitrust process where at least some discretion is given to the authorities in 
order to challenge anticompetitive agreements between normally competing firms. It seems to 
be an exciting challenge to reconcile these approaches within a single model. Another 
interesting topic for future research is to analyze how different regimes of fines
10
 would 
change our results within the new mixed approach proposed. Finally, it would also be 
interesting to apply our analysis to the other domains mentioned in the introduction. 
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6. Appendix 
 
The net expected collected fines are given by: 
E(Collected Fine) =  EF   =      mFmP
3
* ,1    
Two cases are then possible. 
Case 1:  120
2
1 


m . In this case,   1m and   mF
m
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1
1 


 
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The optimal solution for the authority in terms of sharing is then 
2
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expected fine of  mF
m
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2
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

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
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  . It is then easy to see that if F
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3
8
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    the 
best solution is 0* m  and conversely the best solution is to take the highest possible level 
for m , i.e. which verifies 
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1
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2
1
2
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

 . This gives 14
2
1* 


m  
Case 2:  12
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Conversely, when  m   we have 
2
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    Finally, we see that only two configurations are possible at the optimum: 
 
1. The first configuration consists in sharing equally the fine between the authority and the 
audit inspector, 
2
1*  . The expected fine is mF
m
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8
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2. In the second configuration,  
m
m

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2
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   Let us now make a final comparison between the two regimes to analyze the optimal 
combination of  m,  . It turns out that when F
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expected fine of 
2
31
31
4
2
1


  FEF and the second FFEF
2
31
32
8


   
When FF
1
2
3
1
2
22 




 , FEF
1
2
1
8

  and FFEF
2
31
32
8


  . 
Finally, when 
3
1
2
2



F  we have FEF
1
2
1
8

  and 





 12
3
1
32


EF  
It is easy to see that when the cost of gathering the information is relatively high (i.e. 
3
1
2
2



F )  the first regime is better (share equally the fine and do not provide any 
information). Conversely when the cost is relatively small (i.e. 
3
1
2
2



F  ),the second 
regime is better (give the highest share compatible with a probability of detection equals to 
the unity and choose the level 
*m accordingly). Finally, for intermediate values (
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   it is easy to show that the first regime dominates since we have 
supposed that 12
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